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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence systems require a through assessment
of different pillars of trust, namely, fairness, interpretabil-
ity, data and model privacy, reliability (safety) and robust-
ness against against adversarial attacks. While these research
problems have been extensively studied in isolation, an un-
derstanding of the trade-off between different pillars of trust
is lacking. To this extent, the trade-off between fault tol-
erance, privacy and adversarial robustness is evaluated for
the specific case of Deep Neural Networks, by considering
two adversarial settings under a security and a privacy threat
model. Specifically, this work studies the impact of the fault
tolerance of the Neural Network on training the model by
adding noise to the input (Adversarial Robustness) and noise
to the gradients (Differential Privacy). While training mod-
els with noise to inputs, gradients or weights enhances fault
tolerance, it is observed that adversarial robustness and fault
tolerance are at odds with each other. On the other hand,
(ǫ, δ)-Differentially Private models enhance the fault toler-
ance, measured using generalisation error, theoretically has
an upper bound of eǫ − 1 + δ. This novel study of the trade-
off between different elements of trust is pivotal for training
a model which satisfies the requirements for different pillars
of trust simultaneously. The code used for experiments are
available at: https://gitlab.com/vduddu/FaultToleranceNoise.
Introduction
The growing reliance on Artificial Intelligence in safety crit-
ical real time applications such as satellites, autonomous ve-
hicles like unmanned aerial vehicles and space rovers, re-
quires designing trustworthy AI systems. Such applications
with high stakes decision making are required to satisfy fair-
ness among disparate groups, privacy of individuals in the
training data, robustness against adversarially perturbed in-
puts, enhanced fault tolerance for safety and ensure model
interpretability. Hence, it is crucial to understand the trade-
offs between different aspects of trust for designing efficient
Pareto-optimal solutions. In order to address this require-
ment, this research analyses the impact of training machine
learning models, specifically Deep Neural Networks, for ad-
versarial robustness (security) and differential privacy on the
model’s fault tolerance (reliability).
Fault Tolerance is a crucial property for Neural Networks
to ensure reliable computation for long duration and graceful
degradation over time. Typically, well generalised models
have the parameters with low variance ensuring equal com-
putational weightage to all nodes in the network. Hence, loss
of some of the nodes can be compensated by other nodes
without a significant loss in performance (Dey et al. 2018)
(Deodhare, Vidyasagar, and Sathiya Keethi 1998)
(Neti, Schneider, and Young 1992). Practically, this is
achieved by adding noise during training to the inputs,
gradients or the weights.
The noise added to the inputs can be modelled as
Tikhonov regularisation which enhances the generalisation
(Bishop 1995). However, in an adversarial setting under a
security threat model, carefully crafted imperceptible noise
can be added to input images by an adversary, to force the
model to misclassify the image and violating the confiden-
tiality of the model prediction. The design of the Neural Net-
works within such an adversarial setting requires training on
inputswith adversarial noise to ensure robustness against ad-
versary’s worst case perturbation. The goal of this work in
this setting, is to address the research question,
What is the impact of adversarially robust training (in-
put noise) on fault tolerance?
Alternatively, in an adversarial setting under a privacy
threat model, an adversary performs inference attacks to
identify training data attributes or membership details for
sampled data point. This poses a serious privacy risk for
sensitive training data such as financial and medical records,
personal photos, location history and preferences. Differen-
tial Privacy provides provable guarantee on the maximum
privacy leakage by making the data points indistinguishable
using gradient noise during training (Abadi et al. 2016). In
such a setting, this work addresses the research question,
What is the impact of training models with Differential
Privacy (gradient noise) on fault tolerance?
Main Contributions. In this work, the following are the
novel contributions:
• Evaluate the fault tolerance of provably robust Neural
Networks and compare them with the theoretical equiv-
alent Tikhonov regularised model.
• Evaluate the fault tolerance of Differentially Private
model under a privacy threat model and compare it with
regularised and naturally trained models.
• Prove theoretically that generalisation error used to mea-
sure fault tolerance has an upper bound of eǫ − 1 + δ on
training the model using (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy, thus
giving provable guarantees on fault tolerance.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which
evaluates the fault tolerance of adversarially robust and dif-
ferentially private Deep Neural Networks. Such an analysis
is crucial for a unified framework for trustworthy machine
learning combining security, privacy and reliability for real
world deployment.
Background
Fault Tolerance in Neural Networks
Definition 1. A Neural Network N performing computa-
tions HN is said to be fault tolerant if the computation per-
formed by a faulty network HNfault is close to HN . For-
mally, a Neural Network is ǫ fault tolerant if,∥∥HN (X ) −HNfault(X )∥∥ ≤ ǫ (1)
for ǫ > 0 and X ∈ D.
Fault Tolerance Metric. Improving the generalisation,
results in enhancing the fault tolerance and vice versa
(Bernier et al. 2001). Hence, capturing the overfitting of
the model provides a way to compare the relative fault
tolerance of multiple models which has been extensively
used in literature to measure fault tolerance of Neural
networks (Wang et al. 2018) (Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019).
Formally, given a datasetDtest such thatDtrain∩Dtest = φ,
the accuracy of the model is estimated on the training set
Rtrain and on the testing set Rtest. The generalisation error
is given by the difference between training accuracy and the
testing accuracy,
Gerr = Rtrain −Rtest (2)
This gives the estimate of overfitting in the neural network
(Rtrain > Rtest), i.e, higher the generalisation error more
the overfitting. This estimate of fault tolerance is used for
evaluation of different Neural Networks throughout the pa-
per.
Fault Model. In this work, the fault occurring in the hard-
ware is simulated in the form of stuck at “0” errors in the
Neural network computation. Further,multiple faults can oc-
cur simultaneously for which the goal is measure the per-
formance of the model using test accuracy. The faults are
simulated in two major ways: firstly, these faults can mani-
fest in the form of random node crashes in the Neural Net-
work due to which the output of the neurone is always put
to zero. Secondly, the parameters of the Neural Networks
can be stuck at “0” which includes both the weights in case
of Multi Layer Perceptron and the filter and kernel values
in case of convolutional neural networks. This is a common
fault model frequently used in evaluating the reliability of
systems (Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019).
Related Work. A widely used approach for en-
hancing fault tolerance is to penalize large val-
ues of the parameters by a regularisation func-
tion (Dey et al. 2018) (Wang et al. 2018). Alterna-
tively, constraint optimisation approaches using min-
imax constraint (Neti, Schneider, and Young 1992)
as well as quadratic programming
(Deodhare, Vidyasagar, and Sathiya Keethi 1998) can be
used for very small networks. Unlike simple regularisation
functions, unsupervised pre-training of the initial network
layers followed by supervised fine-tuning can significantly
enhance the fault tolerance (Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019).
Traditional techniques to enhance reliability such as
additional redundancy by adding nodes and synapses
(Phatak and Koren 1995) provides partial fault tolerance.
Adversarial Robustness
Within the adversarial setting with a security adversary, the
problem of adversarial robustness is modelled as a game be-
tween the attacker and defender with conflicting interests.
Here, the adversary wants to force the target model to mis-
classify by adding carefully calculated noise to input, while
the defender wants to train the model to defend against such
inputs with adversarial noise.
Attacker Knowledge. In this work, the adversary has no
knowledge about the target model. In other words, the adver-
sary has a remote access to the target black box model and
can query the model and receive corresponding predictions
through an API. This is typically the black box setting seen
in Machine Learning as a Service.
Attacker Goal. The goal of the adversary is to find the
noise to maximise the loss of the target model and force the
model to misclassify the perturbed input. Formally, given an
input x ∈ P (X,Y ), the adversary computes the worst case
adversarial noise δ with the goal to maximise the loss,
δ⋆(x) = argmax
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ(Fθ(x + δ), y) (3)
subject to
∆ = {δ : ||δ||p ≤ ǫ} (4)
The optimisation is subjected to the condition that the noise
is imperceptible by restricting δ within a perturbation region
∆ defined by an l∞ norm (Madry et al. 2018).
Defender Strategy. In order to defend against the worst
attack possible, the model is trained using adversarial inputs
as part of the training data. Formally, this empirical defence
can be modelled as a minmax optimisation problem given
below,
minimize
θ

 1
|D|
∑
x,y∈D
max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ(Fθ(x+ δ), y)

 (5)
Here, instead of just minimise the expected loss value over
the data points sampled from the distribution, the optimisa-
tion solves for minimising the worst case loss over the data
with adversarial noise. In other words, the defender min-
imises the loss corresponding to the worst case adversarial
attack.
In this work, the defence which provides provable bounds
to the defence against adversarial examples is considered.
TRADES algorithm decomposes the prediction error for ad-
versarial example as the sum of natural classification error
and the boundary error and provide a tight differentiable up-
per bound (Zhang et al. 2019). This defence uses Kullback-
Leibler (KL) Divergence between the output prediction dif-
ference between the benign sample and adversarial sample
outputs for generating adversarial examples within the inner
maximisation.
min
θ
(
E[l(θ, F (X), Y )] + max
Xadv∈·(X,ǫ)
dkl(F (X), F (Xadv)
)
(6)
Related Work. While only the defence algorithm
(TRADES) is considered, with tight upper bound
and provable robustness guarantees, there are other
empirical approaches which use Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (Madry et al. 2018) and Wasserstein norm
(Sinha, Namkoong, and Duchi 2018) to ensure robustness.
Alternatively, verification based defences use function trans-
formations to compute the worst case loss to express the ad-
versarial perturbations (Mirman, Gehr, and Vechev 2018).
Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy is the de facto privacy standard which
provides a strong privacy definition with provable bounds on
howmuch information is leaked by a mechanism in terms of
the privacy budget ǫ (Dwork and Roth 2014). The output of
a randomized mechanism should not allow the adversary to
learn any more about a individual than that could be learnt
via the same analysis without the individual in the dataset. In
this sense, this definition of privacy captures the individual’s
membership in the dataset.
Definition 2. For a randomized mechanism M : X → Y
is (ǫ, δ) differentially private on two neighbouring datasets
D and D′ differing by a individual data point, then for all
outputsO ⊆ Y ,
P [M(D) ∈ O] ≤ eǫP [M(D′) ∈ O] + δ (7)
Here, the parameters ǫ is considered as the privacy budget
and δ is considered as the failure probability (Dwork 2008).
A tighter and accurate estimation of the privacy loss
can be computed using the Renyi Differential Privacy
(Mironov 2017) which uses the Renyi divergencemetricDα
which applies to any moment of the privacy loss random
variable.
Definition 3. For a randomized mechanismM : X → Y is
ǫ-Renyi differentially private of the order α, on two neigh-
bouring datasets D and D′ differing by a individual data
point, then for all outputsO ⊆ Y ,
Dα(M(D) || M(D
′)) ≤ ǫ (8)
Attacker Strategy. The goal of the attacker within
the privacy setting, is to use inference attacks to leak
training data details resulting in privacy violation where
the training data is sensitive. Membership inference at-
tacks are used to infer whether a given data point was
used in the training data or not based on the difference
in model predictions on training data and testing data
(Shokri et al. 2017). On the other hand, attribute inference
attacks aim to extract particular features of the training data
(Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015) or the reconstruct the
entire training data (Salem et al. 2019). Another class of at-
tacks, exploits the memorisation capacity of the model to
extract the sensitive attributes in the data by querying the
model (Carlini et al. 2019).
Defender Strategy. The defender, in order, to reduce the
success of the inference attacks utilises the notion of differ-
ential privacy to train the model with provable membership
leakage guarantees. To this extent, the defender samples a
noise from either a Laplace or Gaussian distribution propor-
tional to the sensitivity of the model (S).
M(D) ≃ HN (X ) +N (0, S
2.σ2) (9)
In case of Deep Neural Networks, this noise is added to
the gradients of the model and mitigates several of the at-
tacker’s inference strategies, however, at the cost of utility
(Jayaraman and Evans 2019).
Related Work. In order to preserve the privacy against
membership inference attacks, several empirical defences
exit. For instance, the adversary’s inference attack can be
modelled as a min-max optimisation problem, where the tar-
get model is trained to minimise the adversary’s maximum
attack gain (Nasr, Shokri, and Houmansadr 2018). Another
line of defence, is to add noise to the output of the model,
force the inference attack machine learning model to mis-
classify while ensuring the utility from the model output is
not changes (Jia et al. 2019). While, these approaches are
empirical, all of them face utility privacy trade-off and do
not provide a theoretical guarantee on the maximum leak-
age of the model. Hence, in this work, Differential Privacy
based private training is used since it provides provable
guarantees on the leakage of the model about the training
data (Abadi et al. 2016). An alternative Differential Privacy
based framework using a teacher-student ensemble approach
(Papernot et al. 2018).
Experiment Setup
The code for training using TRADES adversarial algorithm,
is based on the official source code from the authors1. Fur-
ther, the official code of TensorflowPrivacy Library2 for Dif-
ferentially Private training, adapted it to different architec-
tures and datasets.
Datasets
The evaluation and training of adversarially robust and dif-
ferentially private models are done on two major bench-
marking datasets, namely, FashionMNIST and CIFAR10.
FashionMNIST. The dataset is similar to the MNIST
dataset and consists of a training set of 60,000 examples and
a test set of 10,000 examples. Each data sample is a 28×28
grayscale image associated with a label from 10 classes such
as boots, shirt, bag and so on.
CIFAR10. The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000
32x32 colour images in 10 classes, with 6000 images per
class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 test im-
ages.
1https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES
2https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy
Architectures
A Convolutional Deep Neural Network architecture is con-
sidered with nine convolutional layers and two hidden lay-
ers for CIFAR10 dataset since the dataset is complex with
32x32x3 image sizes. In case of FashionMNIST dataset, two
different neural network architectures are used, aMultiLayer
Perceptron and a Convolutional Neural Network. The Multi
Layer Perceptron is a simple architecture with two hidden
layers of 512 nodes each. On the other hand, the convolu-
tional network contains two convolutional and two maxpool
layers followed by a hidden layer. The details of the archi-
tecture are given in Appendix A.
Fault Tolerance and Adversarial Robustness
Input Noise as a Regularizer
Adding noise to inputs has been shown to provide regu-
larization effect that theoretically is equivalent to Tikhonov
regularization (Bishop 1995). In order to understand the ef-
fect on input noise to generalisation, a simple architecture
of 500 hidden layers is considered for a binary classification
problem and differentiating two types of circles. Two types
of noise are considered, namely, additive gaussian noise
and the multiplicative gaussian noise which are commonly
used for enhancing the fault tolerance of neural networks by
improving the generalisation (Ho, Leung, and Sum 2010)
(Holmstrom and Koistinen 1992) (Matsuoka 1992).
σ Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
No Noise
0 100.00% 75.7% 24.3%
Additive Gaussian Noise
0.01 100.00% 77.1% 22.9%
0.1 93.3% 67.1% 26.2%
0.5 73.3 44.3 29.0%
Multiplicative Gaussian Noise
0.03 100.00% 77.1% 22.9%
0.1 96.7% 71.4% 25.3%
0.5 80.0 48.6 31.4%
Table 1: Generalisation Error for additive gaussian noise added to
inputs and for multiplicative gaussian noise added to inputs.
In case of additive noise, on adding a small noise of
standard deviation of 0.01, the generalisation performance
on the binary classification problem improves. However, on
increasing the values of the standard deviation, the model
starts to overfit the noisy training data and the performance
starts to decline. A similar phenomenon is observed on train-
ing models in the presence of worst case adversarial noise as
shown in the subsequent sections.
Adversarial Noise
For CIFAR10 dataset, the performance for robust training
using TRADES and PGD are evaluated and compared with
the baseline of Tikhonov Regularization. Tikhonov regu-
larised models are used as a baseline since, training with
input noise is shown as theoretically equivalent to Tikhonov
function in the objective. As shown in Table 2, as the
strength of adversarial noise increases the overall general-
isation error, i.e, extent of model overfitting, increases.
Algorithm Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
Natural 95.50% 86.24% 9.26%
Tikhonov 89.19% 82.24% 6.95%
TRADES 93.26% 76.04% 17.22%
Table 2: Generalisation Error of Adversarially Robust Models on
CIFAR10 dataset.
For this FMNIST, the generalisation error for both the ad-
versarial training algorithms, namely, TRADES algorithm is
evaluated. As shown in Table 3, the generalisation error for
the models trained using adversarial noise is significantly
higher compared to the generalisation of the Tikhonov regu-
larisation and naturally trained model without any additional
optimisations. This indicates that adversarially computed
noise, in fact, has a negative effect on the fault tolerance.
On evaluating the generalisation error on Multilayer Percep-
tron, the error varies from 3.29% for regularised model to
8.83% for robust models. A similar pattern is observed for a
more complex Convolutional Neural Network, with the gen-
eralisation error from 4.40% for regularised model to 8.01%
for robust models.
Multilayer Perceptron Architecture
Algorithm Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
Natural 98.83% 90.23% 8.60%
Tikhonov 90.99% 87.70% 3.29%
TRADES 98.76% 89.93% 8.83%
Convolutional Neural Network Architecture
Algorithm Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
Natural 98.60% 90.59% 8.01%
Tikhonov 95.94% 91.04% 4.90%
TRADES 99.59% 90.73% 8.86%
Table 3: Generalisation Error of Adversarially Robust Models on
FashionMNIST on both CNN andMLP architectures. Compared to
the Basic Tikhonov Regularization, models trained with adversarial
noise have a larger generalisation error compared to the baseline.
Comparing Fault Tolerance through Parameter
Distribution
Alternatively, another approach to estimate the
fault tolerance is by evaluating the standard devi-
ation of the trained model’s parameter distribution
(Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019). The standard deviation of
the parameters θ of the model is written as,
σ =
√∑
i |θi − θ¯|
N
(10)
where θ¯ is the average of all the parameter values and N is
the total number of parameters in the model. Higher the stan-
dard deviation of the parameter distribution, more varied the
parameters values due to which some nodes are given more
importance over the others. Here, loss of those important
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Figure 1: (Left) CIFAR10. (Right) FashionMNIST. For both the datasets, the distribution for the model trained using Tikhonov regularisa-
tion has a lower standard deviation of the parameter distribution compared to the models trained using adversarial input noise. This deviation
in the distributions indicate that the training using noise enhances fault tolerance only for small values of noise and it is not equivalent to
Tikhonov regularisation.
nodes in case of random faults, result in a significant drop in
accuracy. For low σ, the parameters give equal weightage to
all the nodes inputs and hence, the loss of a few nodes does
not impact the overall model performance.
In Figure 1 (left) for CIFAR10 dataset, the standard de-
viation of the trained robust model is 0.125378 compared
to 0.032451 of the naturally trained model without adver-
sarial robustness. For FMNIST dataset (Figure 1 (right)),
the standard deviation of the robust model was around
0.17901 while the standard deviation for regularized model
was 0.023772. Further, the overall generalisation error dur-
ing training is significantly higher for adversarially robust
models. This indicates that the fault tolerance of models
trained using adversarial noise is significantly less than than
Tikhonov regularized model or naturally trained model.
Impact of Varying ǫadv
ǫadv Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
2/255 90.12% 81.93% 8.19%
4/255 91.02% 80.05% 10.97%
8/255 93.26% 76.04% 17.22%
Table 4: The impact of varying ǫadv values on the fault tolerance
for CIFAR10 dataset.
An important study is to evaluate the impact of increas-
ing the overall range of perturbation added to the inputs, i.e,
ǫadv. Increasing ǫadv, results in increasing the overall noise
region fromwhich the noise can be chosen. Thus, this results
in a the strength of the noise added to the input.
As seen in Table 4, the overall fault tolerance measured
as the difference in training and testing accuracy, increases
with increasing in the noise budget ǫadv. Specifically, for the
case of Convolutional Neural network trained on CIFAR10
dataset, on increasing ǫadv from 2/255 to 8/255, the gen-
eralisation error increases (equivalently fault tolerance de-
creases) from 8.19% to 17.22%.
Simulation of Faults for Adversarially Robust
Models
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Figure 2: Comparison of performance drop in model trained using
Tikhonov regularisation (fault tolerant) and the theoretically equiv-
alent model trained using input noise.
Since, the fault model considered in the paper is random
stuck at ”0” faults, these faults are simulated for adversari-
ally robust models and compare them with Tikhonov regu-
larised models. As seen in Figure 2, on increasing the faults
into the parameters from 50% to 90%, the accuracy drop in
case of regularised model is 1.14% compared to 26.93% of
the robust model. This confirms the above analysis, indicat-
ing that adversarially robust models are less fault tolerant to
regularised models.
Differential Privacy and Fault Tolerance
For the Convolutional Neural Network (Table 5), a clear
trade-off between the generalisation error (fault tolerance)
and the accuracy can be seen. A higher fault tolerance can
be achieved at the cost of low test accuracy. This trade-off
is also observed by other standard functions such as L1 and
L2 regularizers, however, they do not provide privacy guar-
antees. As the privacy leakage bound ǫdp is increased from
0.49 to 106, the generalisation error increases from 0.75% to
4.40%.
Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
NoReg 97.06% 89.92% 7.14%
Tikhonov 90.12% 89.43% 0.69%
ǫdp Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
0.49 76.84% 76.09% 0.75%
2.97 84.35% 83.22% 1.13%
24.66 87.72% 86.26% 1.46%
2×106 94.21% 89.81% 4.40%
Table 5: CNN: Generalisation Error of Differentially Private Mod-
els on FashionMNIST.
As seen in Table 6 for MLP based model, a similar pat-
tern is observed where the generlisation error increases from
1.01% to 8.29% as the values of ǫdp increases.
Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
NoReg 99.58% 89.60% 9.98%
Tikhonov 88.96% 87.45% 1.51%
ǫ Training Accuracy Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error
0.49 80.44% 79.43% 1.01%
2.97 85.70% 83.64% 2.06%
24.66 88.21% 85.43% 2.78%
2×106 96.64% 88.35% 8.29%
Table 6:MLP: Generalisation Error of Differentially Private Mod-
els on FashionMNIST.
Theorem 1. Given a Machine Learning Model trained us-
ing (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy, the model’s fault tolerance
metric, given by the generalisation error, is bounded by
eǫ − 1 + δ.
Proof Sketch. Differential Privacy is a strong notion of
stability where the change in the data point in the training
data should not change the final output. Further, fault toler-
ance is also a notion of stability where a change in the model
architecture should not change the final output. A Differen-
tially private mechanism is also uniform RO stable and the
generalisation error of the mechanism can be bounded by
eǫ − 1 + δ (Wang, Lei, and Fienberg 2016). Since, general-
isation error is used to measure the relative fault tolerance
between different models, the corresponding fault tolerance
is bounded by eǫ − 1 + δ.
Given the data population P of all possible input and out-
put pairs, the model is trained on a subset of data Dtrain
sampled from P by minimising the training error,
Etrain =
1
ntrain
∑
i
l(f(θ, xi), yi) (11)
In order to evaluate the performance on any possible sam-
ple that the model might encounter, we evaluate the er-
ror on the testing dataset Dtest sampled from P , where
Dtest ∩Dtrain = φ.
Etest =
1
ntest
∑
i′
l(f(θ, xi′), yi′) (12)
The generalisation error is given by the difference between
the testing (Etest) and training error (Etrain).
A mechanism which satisfies (ǫ, δ)-Differential
Privacy also satisfies uniform RO stability
(Wang, Lei, and Fienberg 2016). Hence, for datasets D
and D’ differing by a single data point,
|ED − ED′ | ≤ e
ǫ − 1 + δ (13)
Further, generalising this result for the training dataset
and testing dataset,
|Etrain − Etest| ≤ e
ǫ − 1 + δ (14)
Since, the fault tolerance is measured as the difference in
the training and testing error, we can see that this is bounded
by eǫ − 1 + δ on training the model with (ǫ, δ)-Differential
Privacy. This result on provable bound on generalisation er-
ror is based on the folklore theorem by Frank McSherry. For
small values of ǫ, eǫ ≈ 1 + ǫ and hence, eǫ − 1 + δ can
be written as ǫ + δ which is agreement with folklore theo-
rem. Hence, training for privacy objective using Differential
privacy provides an alternate approach for enhancing fault
tolerance with a provable bound on the generalisation error.
Conclusions
Designing a trustworthy machine learning system requires
to understand the trade-offs in different elements of trust.
This work highlights the trade-offs between three such pil-
lars of trust in machine learning, namely, reliability, privacy
and adversarial robustness. This work considers two adver-
sarial settings, with a security threat model where the adver-
sary aims to force the model to misclassify by adding ad-
versarial noise to the input and a privacy threat model where
the adversary aims to infer whether a data point was part of
the sensitive training data or not. Under the security threat
model, the impact of fault tolerance on adversarially robust
neural networks is evaluated and it is shown training neural
networks using provably robust training algorithms results
in overfitting, and hence, decreases the overall fault toler-
ance. Hence, fault tolerance and adversarial robustness are
at odds with each other. Under the privacy threat model, the
fault tolerance of private models trained using Differential
Privacy is evaluated and it is shown that private models ex-
hibit fault tolerance for a careful choice of hyperparameters.
Hence, fault tolerance can be achieved by privately training
models. This is validated theoretically by showing the rela-
tion between the leakage bound of a privately trained model
and bound for fault tolerance.
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Appendix A: Architectures
Here, the details of the architectures used for training the
models on CIFAR10 and FashionMNIST dataset have been
shown. For CIFAR10 dataset and TRADES robust training
algorithm, an architecture with nine convolutional layers fol-
lowed by fully connected layers is used. For FashionMNIST
dataset with robust training, the FMNIST CNN 2 architec-
ture which is similar to the LeNet architecture is used. For
Differential Private training, FMNIST CNN 1 architecture is
used with minor differences in hyperparameters to the FM-
NIST CNN 2 architecture. Further, for evaluating on a sim-
ple Multilayer Perceptron Network, a Neural Network with
two hidden layers of sizes 512 nodes each is used.
Table 7: Different Architectures used for the experiments on CI-
FAR10 and FashionMNIST datasets.
CIFAR10 Architecture FMNIST CNN 1 FMNIST CNN 2
Convolution 32 (3x3)(1) Convolution 20 (5x5)(1) Convolution 16 (8)(1)
Convolution 32 (4x4)(2) MaxPool (2) (2) MaxPool (2) (1)
Convolution 32 (3x3)(1) Convolution 50 (5x5)(1) Convolution 32 (4)(2)
Convolution 64 (3x3)(2) MaxPool (2) (2) MaxPool (2) (1)
Convolution 64 (3x3)(1) Dense 500 Dense 32
Convolution 128 (3x3)(2) Dense 10 Dense 10
Convolution 128 (3x3)(1)
Convolution 256 (3x3)(2) FMNIST DNN
Convolution 256 (3x3)(1) Dense 512
Dense 512 Dense 512
Dense 512 Dense 10
Dense 10
Appendix B: Training Curves of Robust and
Natural Models
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Figure 3: The training curve for naturally training a Neural Net-
work compared to robust training using TRADES algorithm.
As shown in Figure 3, the model on training using ad-
versarially robust algorithm overfits significantly compared
to model trained using natural Stochastic Gradient Descent.
In this particular architecture, the generalisation error of ro-
bust models is about 17% compared to 9% error of naturally
trained model.
Appendix C: Differential Privacy Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Training by adding noise
to gradients during Backpropagation
Input:Dtrain = {(xi, yi), · · · , (xNm, yN )} and Loss func-
tion: L(θt, xi)
1: for each epoch do
2: Sample a random batch B ∈ Dtrain
3: for each (xi, yi) ∈ B do
4: Compute gradient:
∂Li
∂θt
← ∇θtL(θt, xi)
5: Gradient Clipping:
gt(xi)←
∂Li
∂θt
/max
(
1,
‖
∂Li
∂θt
‖2
C
)
6: Add Noise:
g′t ←
1
L
(∑
i gt(xi) +N (0, σ
2C2I)
)
7: Update θ using Gradient Descent:
θt+1 ← θt − αg′t
8: end for
9: Output: θt computed using (ǫ, δ)-Differential Pri-
vacy
10: end for
